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Debt presents a dilemma to societies: successful societies benefit from a substantial 
infrastructure of consumer, commercial, corporate, and sovereign debt but debt can cause 
substantial private and social harm. Pre- and post-crisis solutions have seesawed between 
subsidizing and restricting debt, between leveraging and deleveraging. A consensus exists 
among governments and international financial institutions that financial stability is the 
fundamental normative principle underlying financial regulation. Financial stability, however, 
is insensitive to equality concerns and can produce morally impermissible aggregations in 
which the least advantaged in a society are made worse off. Solutions based only on financial 
stability can restrict debt without accounting for the risk of harm to persons least able to bear 
the risk, worsen pre-existing inequalities, destroy or impair the net worth of households, and 
impose unfavorable distributive consequences. This article offers a new approach to assist 
policymakers in developing and evaluating regulation to take criteria in addition to financial 
stability into account, but which do not undermine the aim of financial stability. It calls for a 
luck egalitarian approach, offering policymakers options to take the debtor’s choices into 
account while still accounting for cognitive mistakes people often make in debt decision 
making. It offers a general framework for the underlying principles for the regulation of debt: 
its focus is not on any particular forms of debt or its regulation but in structuring debt regulation 
more generally. It offers a set of recommendations on how regulators can take concerns about 
luck and equality into account in regulatory design.  
 




No successful society exists without a substantial infrastructure of consumer, 
commercial, and sovereign debt. Using a concept familiar in the political theory of John 
Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, access to credit is a “resource” in many societies, which 
means that it is a primary means by which persons develop and implement plans for 
their lives. In many societies, the less net worth a household has, the more that 
household needs debt to obtain access to adequate housing, decent schools, 
transportation for good jobs, and an essential measure of security in the event of job 
loss or other emergencies and catastrophes (Bar Gill & Warren 2008)(Leicht 2012). 
Debt is sometimes used as start-up capital for small businesses, often in the form of 
personal debt held by the owners of the business (Meyer 2017). Sovereign debt plays 
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important welfare-enhancing and resource-distributing functions for entire populations. 
Governments have used borrowing to finance civil works, education, pensions, and 
health care for their citizens. Of course, debt is a very common means by which firms 
finance their operations. Banks fund themselves almost entirely on debt (Admati & 
Hellwig 2014). Some important social goods should perhaps be delinked from 
acquisition through debt, but the task here is to apply standard ceteris paribus 
assumptions common to the social sciences to examine the role of the regulatory 
institutions of debt in societies. 
Despite its opportunities to produce good, debt can also cause substantial private 
and social harm. The rigidity of debt – its essential characteristic of a fixed claim for 
payment – makes it dangerous when fortunes fall. Default on debt by individuals and 
households can lead to downward social mobility and even poverty for families, job 
loss, health problems, stress, marital problems, and family instabilities (Porter 2012). 
Beyond these private harms, as we have seen in the most recent financial crisis, losses 
associated with excessive debt in a society can be enormous and lead to systemic 
failures in national and global economies, with substantial adverse effects 
disproportionately on persons of limited financial means. The highly-leveraged 
positions of banks make them dangerous not only to themselves but to entire societies 
and the world (Admati & Hellwig 2014)(Turner Review 2009)(Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission 2011). 
The core claim of this article is that a just society would structure its institutions for 
the access to credit and allocation of debt in a way that is sensitive to basic concerns 
about equality. Take as a given in a non-ideal society that persons in that society must 
use debt to access some basic social goods. If this is the case, then the debt needed to 
access these basic social goods must comply with the demands of equality. The 
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overriding normative focus of debt regulation is currently on financial stability of the 
overall economy (Adenas & Chiu 2014)(Arner 2007), with equality playing little if any 
role, depending on the society in question.1 When developing regulation and policy 
relevant to debt, governments need to focus on more than financial stability as the end 
of managing the effects of debt in society. They need also to focus on equality sensitive 
access to credit. Governments ought to be sensitive to the dilemma that debt presents 
to societies: we need debt to make our lives go well, but we also need to avoid debt to 
make our lives go well. Debt can be bad for people, firms, and governments but so can 
restricting it.  
Most of the studies of debt and its effects on society are in economics or what might 
more broadly be known as a version of welfare utilitarianism. Welfarist approaches 
hold a powerful influence in policy circles in governments and international financial 
institutions. This article takes a different turn. It relies on insights from political theory 
not previously relied upon to evaluate the regulation of debt. This article relies on a 
prominent version of resource-based luck egalitarianism commonly associated with 
Ronald Dworkin, though he did not consider himself a luck egalitarian, Eric Rakowski, 
and others (Dworkin 2000)(Dworkin 2003)(Rakowski 1993). Luck egalitarianism is 
relevant to evaluating the law on access to credit because it offers an approach that is 
sensitive to individual responsibility as well as to considerations of justice. It mitigates 
the harshness of wholly individualized conceptions of risk while still holding people 
responsible for transactions in which they realistically make choices. Because debt is 
structured in the form of a transaction in which people at least ostensibly make choices, 
taking some level of responsibility into account seems essential in making normative 
judgments about the fairness of debt, though as we shall see, choice about debt may not 
be as responsibility sensitive as we might at first blush think it might be. We also want 
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to know how circumstances and unchosen or what Dworkin calls “brute” luck affect 
debtors and creditors.2  
In the tradition of Rawlsian wide reflective equilibrium, economics and finance are 
not ignored. These fields hold greatest relevance for corporate and commercial debt. 
For consumer and possibly sovereign debt, economic policy prescriptions tend to focus 
on one thing: restricting debt or deleveraging. Deleveraging is a necessary but 
incomplete focus. A focus on financial stability leads regulators to ignore or downplay 
concerns about justice and fairness. A look at distribution from an economic point of 
view can offer significant data-driven insights about cause and effect but economics 
offers inadequate normative criteria for assessing whether a distribution is morally 
acceptable. A focus on financial stability is laudable, given the instability that excessive 
debt caused in the global economy in the most recent financial crisis, but if we do not 
also focus on how that stability is achieved and at who suffers the burdens of it, the net 
result could be to needlessly make vulnerable persons worse off. The overriding focus 
on financial stability has meant that governments have ignored other worthy goals. If 
financial stability could be achieved by means that impose fewer harms on less well-
off groups, or which contribute less to income inequality, then these means need to be 
identified and prioritized.  
Part 1 of the article explains the moral relevance of the access to credit architecture 
of a society, showing why debt it not only about individual choice. Part 2 elucidates 
conditions that should be met for debt regulation to comply with moral demands 
associated with equality. It provides a set of principles to guide policy entrepreneurs 
towards developing the regulation of debt to be sensitive to the demands of equality. 
These principles are not moral principles but a set of intermediate or second order 
principles that flow from luck egalitarianism. Moreover, while these intermediate 
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principles offer standards for the evaluation of regulation, no single standard can do the 
job of making debt regulation comply with moral demands. Which principle is more or 
less relevant will depend on the regulatory context and the particular kind of debt to be 
regulated.  Part 2 argues for a continuum of considerations of equality to apply to the 
various forms of debt, with some forms of debt requiring more sensitivity to 
considerations of justice than others. For example, we will find it reasonably acceptable 
to subject corporate debt to the full logic of economics but will not find it to be 
reasonably acceptable for home mortgages or student debt. This article makes a case 
for a more rigorous understanding of how this equality sensitive continuum can operate 
in a society. Part 3 deals with the regulatory implications for the equality concerns 
developed in Parts 1 and 2. It offers a framework for incorporating the moral demands 
of equality, as they are understood in an influential luck egalitarian philosophical 
account of equality, into the methods of regulatory evaluation and design.  
This is not a traditional work of ‘pure’ political philosophy. It takes empirical 
considerations and factual contexts into account that will be of interest to policy makers 
and regulators but perhaps less so to philosophers. It accepts the philosophical apparatus 
offered by Dworkin and others and does not seek to build upon or critique the concepts 
found in this work. Its use of philosophy is applied, designed to advance policy debates, 
in way that may be characterized as ‘institutionally sensitive’ (Cranor 2007)(Cranor 
1999). It is meant to offer alternative guidance to regulators and policy makers that may 
be overlooked because of the dominance of economic approaches in the making of 
regulation. Some of its examples or empirical insights might be of less interest to 
philosophers but are necessary to bring moral concerns about equality to the attention 




1. The Moral Relevance of Debt Regulation 
In brief outline, luck egalitarianism can be understood as a set of theories of justice 
that take the responsibility of the choices people make into account in determining how 
principles of distributive justice might be relevant (Knight & Stemplowska 2011). Luck 
egalitarians ask in deciding on how to distribute resources:  under what conditions 
should people be held responsible for their choices when it comes to what they are owed 
as a matter of distributive justice? Should at least some aspect of justice depend on what 
people can be held responsible for, based on their choices?  Luck egalitarianism is 
choice sensitive, but unlike economics, the prevalent welfarist alternative, it offers a 
finer grained conception of choice in which constraints an agent cannot control are not 
ignored in deciding how and what to allocate or distribute. In luck egalitarian accounts, 
some constraints negate the salience of choice and this becomes important in regulatory 
design. Some luck egalitarians rely on a decision procedure akin to Rawls’s veil of 
ignorance in the original position. Dworkin offers perhaps the most prominent example, 
with his hypothetical insurance market in an equal auction at the beginning of society. 
When it comes to applying Dworkin (or any other) account that depends on such a 
decision procedure in the context of regulatory design, the procedure at bottom comes 
down to asking whether it is reasonable to ask people to bear risks they had no role in 
creating or cannot control.     
People think of debt as a transaction between a debtor and a creditor, requiring a 
choice by the debtor to borrow and the creditor to lend. Surely, the story goes, our 
choice to take on debt means that we have taken what Dworkin calls a “calculated 
gamble” in the form of what he characterizes as “option” luck. Our choice would 
therefore take debt outside the area of concerns about equality. Egalitarian justice would 
have no role in relation to debt creating and enforcing institutions.  
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In this purely choice-oriented conception of debt, the ordinary market risk 
associated with debt is classic option luck. Ordinary market risk is risk that a person (or 
entity) assumes for oneself when transacting in a market. If for example an individual 
buys a home with a mortgage, she assumes the risk that the value of the house will 
decline and that the mortgage may go underwater if there is insufficient equity in the 
home. She also assumes the benefit of a rise in the price of the house.    
The law frames the concept of debt as choice sensitive. Debt becomes legally 
binding through the branch of private law creating legal obligations through voluntary 
exchange – the law of contract. Of course, some private law has developed to protect 
the vulnerable, but its scope is extremely limited. In the common law of contract, Lord 
Denning stated in his famous dictum in Lloyd’s Bank v Bundy3 that all contract law 
doctrines dealing with inequality of bargaining power should be developed into a single 
legal principle, but no such principle has ever developed in Anglo-American contract 
law, which specifies very limited doctrines of unconscionability, undue influence, and 
duress to deal only with the worst forms of abuse. In Anglo-American law, the lender-
borrower relationship generally does not establish a fiduciary relationship (Pottow 
2011). In the language of contract often used in law and economics, fiduciary rules are 
not part of the terms of the debt contract. On the regulatory side, there is the domestic 
and European legal apparatus to deal with abusive practices in consumer transactions, 
but the rules offer sporadic protection in limited cases and often focus primarily on 
disclosure, a form of regulation that presumes consumers are rational choosers able to 
take advantage of the information disclosed (Ramsey 2012). 
The rational choice version of law and economics frames debt around choice and 
contract. Contract theory as it is understood in law and economics frames commercial 
law around contract, in the frame of the Coase Theorem (Kraus & Walt 2007). In this 
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rational choice context, regulation – law that parties cannot choose to include or exclude 
in their contract - interferes with choice and usually makes contracting parties worse 
off (Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler 1998). Of course, a debt contract can be and is regulated 
but that regulation is understood in the rational choice version of law and economics as 
exceptional, requiring a market failure justification. Without such justification, 
regulation in rational choice theory amounts to Pareto inferior choice-interfering 
mandatory rules imposing transaction costs on rational choosers. According to the 
rational choice story, people who make decisions in the market for debt take Dworkin’s 
gamble and put themselves at the mercy of their own choices.4 There is no relationship 
of debt to inequality in this approach.  
The rational choice account fails to capture the moral relevance of debt and its 
regulation for many reasons. Preliminarily, its basic presuppositions fail. A decision by 
a person to borrow is subject to well-accepted cognitive shortcomings afflicting 
individuals (Bar Gill 2012)(Harris & Albin 2006). But looking only to cognitive 
grounds is incomplete because it does not inform us what steps need to be taken to 
address equality concerns from a moral perspective. We need to get beyond cognitive 
grounds and investigate unchosen circumstances. We are by now familiar with the brute 
facts of lotteries: the birth, zip or post code, household net worth, education, and health 
lotteries affecting people’s life chances are examples. The brute facts of inequality itself 
tell us that choice is but of partial concern when it comes to debt. If a society makes 
important resource distributing decisions mainly through markets, then the chances are 
high that the less well off a person is, the more debt she will have relative to her income. 
She may also suffer from restrictions on access to credit, leaving her with poor choices 
(Turner 2016). Life is a lottery we have no choice but to play. Circumstances come 
prior to choice and choice depends on them. A Rawlsian-type basic structure of society 
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substantially determines what we choose, because it determines what we can choose, 
our set of available choices, why we are choosing, and how our choices affect quality 
of life.  
 Moving beyond the limits of choice, the next question is whether debt, or perhaps 
more accurately access to credit, is a resource subject to the demands of equality. The 
version of luck egalitarian relied upon in this article is resource-based. Access to credit 
is a resource to achieve something important to the life projects of a person, usually to 
acquire other important resources essential to those life projects, such as in the purchase 
of a home with mortgage credit, or to borrow to pay for a university degree, to use a 
credit card to avoid spending savings budgeted for other purposes or to use credit to 
pay health care bills if government fails to provide access to health care based on need 
rather than ability to pay. A home mortgage finances more than a place to live. It is 
finances a mix of consumption and investment. Priced into the housing market is access 
to good schools, locations with low levels of environmental pollution and health 
hazards, and access to good transportation and other public infrastructure (Atkinson 
2015)(Bar Gill & Warren 2008). So, access to credit takes on major importance as a 
resource that leads to access to other resources essential to leading a good life.  
People make choices about debt that relate to access to resources affecting their life 
prospects in complex ways. We may not think of forms of corporate or commercial 
credit as relevant to equality of resource concerns but that may not be true in all cases. 
There will be cases in which access to credit relates to access to the opportunity to 
innovate, such as in the promotion of entrepreneurship. Owner-entrepreneurs fund 
small business start-ups with their personal finances or in combination with financing 
from family members and a substantial debt component often is present in this financing 
(Akseli 2012).  
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Sovereign debt has a substantial resource distributing function. Governments 
borrow for many of the same reasons that individuals do, to consume more goods today, 
often in the form of public goods, goods undersupplied by markets, or goods that people 
cannot afford on their own. Governments could finance these goods by raising taxes, 
but in some cases is better to borrow and slowly repay the debt over time through 
taxation into the future. This is known as “tax smoothing” (Barro 1979). Tax smoothing 
works like consumption smoothing through a home mortgage, an education loan, an 
auto loan, or on debt on commercial real estate such as a hotel or a university residence 
hall. These debtors need a large chunk of money now to capitalize an asset, which they 
pay off with funds from a future income stream. Governments have used borrowing to 
finance civil works, education, pensions, and health care. In some cases, governments 
might project these investments as increasing GDP in the future, from which taxes can 
be drawn to pay off the debt. Of course, governments sometimes get the financing 
model wrong, particularly when exogenous events alter macroeconomic conditions, 
requiring sovereign debt to be restructured.  
In addition to making resources available to debtors, debt also makes resources 
available to indirect beneficiaries who are not parties to the debtor-creditor relationship. 
For example, education has public good characteristics. Society benefits when people 
earn university degrees. People with higher education earn more than those without it. 
The global economy provides increasing rewards for jobs requiring university degrees. 
People with university degrees innovate far more than those without degrees. 
University graduates are more civically engaged (Newell 2014)(Flanagan & Levine 
2010).  
There is a similar story of private home ownership. Owners take better care of their 
properties than tenants. Crime is lower in neighborhoods with substantial levels of 
11 
 
private home ownership (Dietz & Haurin 2003). Home owners are more civically 
engaged than tenants (Glaeser & Di Pasquale 1999)(Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995). 
Private home owners tend to have higher net worth than renters, which they can use as 
resources to support their families and children, such as in the funding of higher 
education. The relationship between housing, wealth, and inequality is substantial and 
further combines with other factors such as inequality between generations within 
families to race and ethnicity (Case, Quigley, & Shiller 2005)(Krivo & Kaufman 
2004).5 
The potential harm from debt is also significant. Systemic risk in finance has 
substantial moral implications (Linarelli 2017). Systemic risk differs from market risk 
because the risk is explicitly on persons who are not parties to the debt contract. My 
transaction does not impose a risk on me, or at least not only on me, but also on others. 
The distinction between ordinary market risk and systemic risk aligns closely with 
Dworkin’s distinction between option luck and brute luck. Everyone in society is 
vulnerable to the risk of indisputably bad brute luck because of systemic risk. Systemic 
financial risk has the potential to harm someone even if they had nothing to do with the 
transactions causing the harm. Exposure to systemic financial risk is an unfortunate 
circumstance having nothing to do with choosing but with being a member of a society.  
Finally, the regulatory institutions for debt are relevant on egalitarian grounds 
because debt is a more important institution for the distribution of resources for the poor 
than the rich. Debt often distributes resources to the less fortunate in morally perverse 
ways. Mortgage lending offers a good example. Mortgage lenders, usually in the form 
of banks, obtain liquidity for lending from their investors: depositors, who are actually 
a class of creditors in the bank, other creditors, and shareholders. Atif Mian and Amir 
Sufi refer to these providers of liquidity as “savers” (Mian & Sufi 2014). When we say 
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a bank has a mortgage in a home, we are really saying that savers have a property right, 
understood from a functional or economic point of view, in the borrower’s home. Now 
consider how debtor-creditor law and regulation affects equality. Savers usually have 
high net worth and borrowers low net worth, or at least the net worth of borrowers is 
low enough cause them to borrow to buy a home. Because debt is rigid, if house prices 
decline, the losses concentrate on the borrowing homeowners. If they are poor enough, 
family net worth disappears when house prices decline. The ruination of the finances 
of low net worth households can have dire consequences for entire families (Glater 
2015)(Leicht 2012) (Warren 2002). But savers in a down market fare relatively better 
(Mian & Sufi 2014). They bear no loss on individual mortgages because debt is rigid 
and represents a fixed claim for payment regardless of the value of the asset securing 
it. Savers may lose in some repossession or foreclosure contexts if their home is in a 
jurisdiction that makes it difficult to collect on the borrower beyond the value of the 
home or when the borrower is judgment proof, but given that they are affluent, they are 
likely diversified and have relatively little debt themselves, so they suffer far less. The 
result is that the distribution of losses in the down market falls disproportionately on 
low net worth borrowers, those least able to bear the losses. Of course, borrowers 
benefit when house prices appreciate, though their gains are relatively illiquid unless 
they can access the gains through even more debt in the form of a second mortgage, but 
savers benefit too when house prices appreciate, as their diversified portfolios rise in 
value and they continue to collect fixed payments on mortgage debt.   
These arguments relate to the structure of debt generally and extend beyond 
mortgages. We can apply a similar line of argument to non-consumer forms of debt, for 
example, to government and corporate debt. In some cases, debt is morally 
unobjectionable, as in the case of some corporate bond contexts. We should not worry 
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too much about diversified and sophisticated debtors and creditors or investors in 
capital markets. Contract and choice can play more prominent roles in regulating these 
relationships. But when debt is used to acquire resources for an effective plan of life, 
moral concerns become salient.  
2. Developing Equality Sensitive Debt Regulation 
How can the above points be put to work in the development of regulation for debt 
and access to credit in a manner that complies with the demands of equality? The aim 
is to develop a set of principles that governments can use to evaluate whether regulation 
meets these demands. As explained above, these are not moral principles, but a set of 
intermediate principles grounded in the moral assessment of the preceding part. They 
are designed to supplement the financial stability principle. In the discussion of these 
principles, paradigmatic forms of debt, as they are created by the law and regulation, 
are evaluated to determine whether they comply with relevant moral demands. 
2.1 Avoid Financing Public Goods Primarily Through Private Debt 
The state should not require persons to take out significant debt to further a policy 
aim, unless that policy aim has no role other than to benefit the debtor, the debtor can 
make an unbiased choice about the debt, and the debt does not substantially impair the 
life projects of the debtor. Some goods are important and valuable both for individuals 
and for society to flourish. These goods have both private and public benefits. 
Economists characterize these goods with mixed characteristics as imperfect public 
goods. Government ought not generally impose debt on persons to pay for goods that 
others benefit from, unless it can justify the debt as effectively a tax on those able to 
pay. The private features of such goods might mean that they are amenable to 
acquisition by persons individually, possibly through debt, but cases will exist in which 
even the private benefit aspects of these goods mandate government assistance where 
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the debtor’s circumstances are such that self-financing is morally objectionable 
because, for example, such self-financing does not meet standards of egalitarian justice.  
Student loans are an example of the kind of debt that can violate this first principle. 
It is well accepted that higher education has both public and private goods 
characteristics (Toutkouschian & Paulsen 2016)(Marginson 2014). Moreover, degrees 
and inequality very positively correlate. The wealthier a student’s family, the greater 
the chances that she will enroll in higher education. Richer students with lower 
academic indicators have a better chance of earning an undergraduate degree than 
poorer students with higher academic indicators, throwing into doubt merit-based 
arguments about university admissions. A structure for financing university education 
cannot simultaneously (i) impose substantial debt burdens on graduates from more 
modest family backgrounds and (ii) expect these graduates to shoulder the costs of the 
public goods aspects of university education.   
Student debt data for the United States is startling. It quintupled in the United States 
in the past three decades (Akers & Chingos 2016).6 The latest available data on student 
loans in the United States puts it at about $1.25 trillion, amounting to about ½ of the 
GDP of the United Kingdom, with almost 42 million borrowers. Those over sixty years 
of age hold over $43 billion in student debt. Empirical research shows that student debt 
adversely affects the life prospects and social mobility of graduates in substantial ways, 
impairing their net worth for a lifetime, making it difficult to borrow for homes, and 
generally diminishing their life prospects (Konczal 2014). Availability of student loans 
in the United States comprise part of the reason for tuition fee increases far outstripping 
general price increases (Baum 2016)(Glater 2016(Glater 2015).7   
The United Kingdom is another country that uses substantial student debt to finance 
higher education. It is difficult to compare data between the United States and the 
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United Kingdom because American student loans include substantial numbers of 
graduate students as well as students not at four-year institutions. Data on the growth 
of student debt when fees became significant in the United Kingdom show steady 
growth from £7.8 billion in lending in 2012-13 to £12.2 billion in 2015-16. Student debt 
in the UK accumulates to £86.2 billion. The data shows a remarkable participation rate 
of 90 percent from 2013-2016 and 89 percent for 2012-13 (Bolton 2016)(Bolton 
2012)(Crawford, Crawford, & Jin 2014). 
Access to higher education is a resource in any resource-based account of 
egalitarian justice if it is an essential or important means by which to achieve life goals. 
The primary means by which to obtain that access would qualify in these conditions as 
a resource as well. The College Board in the United States estimates that the lifetime 
earnings for bachelor’s degree graduates are 66 percent higher than those with a high 
school diploma. The data is robust that in addition to the so-called wage or income 
premium that higher education creates relates to better health outcomes, people who 
earn an undergraduate degree are less likely to commit a crime, more likely to be 
civically engaged (Baum 2016)(Taylor et al. 2014)(Edmiston, Brooks, & Shepelwich 
2015)(Browne 2010)(Glater 2016).8 As summed up in the Milburn Report in the United 
Kingdom, “In short, graduates are wealthier, healthier and happier” (Milburn 2012). 
To comply with standards of egalitarian justice as laid out in Part 1, the state must 
neutralize bad brute luck if its aims are morally principled. The relationship between 
student debt and egalitarian justice can be understood around three questions: (1) do 
fees by themselves breach standards for egalitarian justice?; (2) if not, how could debt 
for higher education be made to meet standards of egalitarian justice?; and (3) what 
does egalitarian justice have to do with the fact that higher education has both public 
and private benefits? 
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As for the first question: It seems clear that charging tuition fees to gain access to 
higher education with no government assistance breaches egalitarian standards of 
justice. With substantial tuition fees, only students from wealthy families would be able 
to take advantage of the benefits of higher education. Having students pay for their own 
higher education without any financial assistance from the state would violate basic 
principles of moral equality because students lack equal starting points resulting from 
circumstances entirely beyond their control and not from their own choices. This is 
classic brute luck.  
Access to higher education very directly relates to household wealth. This is true 
even when government grants and subsidized lending are available. Several studies 
show that the wealthier the family, the more likely the student is to attend and graduate 
from college or university. US Department of Education data show that high-income 
students scoring relatively low on standardized tests are more likely to earn degrees 
than low-income students with higher test scores (Blundell, Green, & Jin 2016) (Gould 
2012)(Bailey & Dynarski 2011). These studies are all done in the context of a 
substantial debt infrastructure to assist students in need of funds to pay tuition fees for 
college or university. They reveal that merit works in the opposite direction: ability to 
pay is overriding when it comes to access to higher education. While we cannot test for 
a situation in which fees are charged in the absence of government assistance, we can 
reasonably infer that the situation would likely be worse in such a case.  
Add to the household wealth lottery the geography lottery: students may through no 
choice of their own reside in regions in a country charging higher tuition fees for access 
to their public system of higher education than students in other regions. Students 
residing in Scotland, for example, pay no tuition fees, while students residing in 
England pay substantial fees. Students residing in California pay lower fees in their 
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public system of higher education than students residing in Pennsylvania.9 Add to the 
geography lottery that some US states maintain generous grant systems while others 
have none at all.    
Finally, the intergenerational effects of student tuition fees have to be considered. 
Tuition fees for higher education have the real potential to undermine social mobility 
and entrench bad brute luck across generations. There are various kinds of bad brute 
luck and one such kind is the luck one has in the initial opportunity phase of one’s life 
(Vallentyne 2002). 
But let us assume for the sake of argument that there may be a way to finance higher 
education in a just manner through debt. Given the above-identified bad brute luck 
lotteries, we now face the second question: how could debt for higher education be 
made to meet demands of equality? Do student loans as they currently exist in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, for example, two societies in which students in 
higher education pay substantial tuition fees, neutralize bad brute luck? 
The second question can be answered by looking at the terms of the student debt 
contract and how it is regulated. For many years in the United States, student loans did 
the opposite of neutralizing bad brute luck. Rather, they aggravated the effects of bad 
brute luck because of the extreme rigidity of student loans. UK student loan debt suffers 
less from this rigidity because the loan repayment conditions that make it more flexible 
have been in place for the most part since the inception of the loan program, unlike in 
the United States. Rigidity refers to the characteristics of debt as a legal obligation for 
scheduled fixed payments from the debtor to the creditor regardless of the debtor’s 
circumstances or market conditions. Making debt less rigid would make it more 
amenable to accommodating life circumstances and thus more sensitive to equality 
concerns as they are understood in this article.  As will be further explained in part 2.3 
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below, student loans have historically been more rigid than most debt, typically not 
dischargeable even when the debtor files for personal bankruptcy. The injustice that can 
flow from debt rigidity is covered in part 2.3 below.  
 On to the third question: what does egalitarian justice have to do with the fact that 
higher education has both private and public benefits? It advises governments on the 
need for balance and risk sharing in the financing of higher education. College and 
university degrees produce public benefits. Graduates produce positive externalities to 
societies. To the extent that poor and less affluent students must rely on loans and these 
loans subsidize higher education and societies, these students are in a position to object 
from a moral point of view. Adequate assistance must be provided. The relaxing of loan 
rigidity of loans is an important step. It provides for risk sharing between society and 
students. But an expanded grants system to reduce the ratio of loans to outright 
assistance would be an improvement from a moral point of view.  
It is reasonable to impose some costs on students for future private benefits they 
will acquire as graduates. The economics of student lending informs us that student 
loans are a financial means by which a person transfers wealth from a future life period 
of relative prosperity to the present when times are lean (Akers & Chingos 2016). 
Student debt generates the opportunity for future prosperity.10 It is well understood in 
economics that student lending finances an investment in human capital. This 
investment pays private as well as public benefits. Some personal investment is morally 
acceptable so long as its terms comply with the standards of egalitarian justice discussed 
above. To comply with the first principle, that of avoiding the financing of public goods 
primarily through private debt, we want our moral convictions to be respected while 




2.2. Do Not Unreasonably Restrict Equality-Sensitive Access to Credit 
 
As discussed in part 1, access to credit and wealth are positively correlated. The 
lower a person’s net worth, the more they rely on debt. Generally, access to credit is a 
more important institution for distributing resources for the poor than for the rich. We 
can say with some certainty that a good number (but certainly not all) of low-net worth 
persons in a society are in their disadvantaged position as a result of bad brute luck. For 
these persons, we would want the balancing of responsibility and justice in our luck 
egalitarian framework to put more weight on justice, to remediate the effects of bad 
brute luck. The question then becomes how to pick out which forms of credit are more 
or less sensitive to these egalitarian concerns. Under our luck egalitarian framework, 
some forms of credit will be more equality sensitive than others. If the kind of credit in 
issue is likely to neutralize bad brute luck inequalities and relates to distributing 
important resources in a society, then it is more apt for institutional design along 
egalitarian lines.  
The home mortgage in societies in which substantial private home ownership is 
prevalent is an example of an equality sensitive form of credit. The regulation of 
mortgages took a turn after the global financial crisis of 2007-09 towards substantial 
restrictions of mortgage availability for low net worth households. These regulatory 
changes were designed around a single principle: financial stability. Reliance on the 
single variable of financial stability in designing mortgage credit allocation systems 
risks substantial restrictions on access to home mortgage credit for the less well off.   
The UK’s Turner Review, issued in March 2009, recommended a regulatory 
response to the crisis that included substantial reform of the regulation of mortgages 
towards actual product regulation and not simply disclosure – to what is known as 
regulation of the conduct of business of mortgage providers (Turner 2009).11  The 
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Review found: “Though not to the same extent as in the US subprime market, [UK] 
mortgage credit was extended to social categories which would not previously have 
enjoyed access . . .  (Turner Review 2009). From an egalitarian perspective, the fallacy 
in the Turner Review’s conclusions about mortgage credit is its evaluation of “credit-
hungry families,” “on the breadline,” and “surviving singles.” The Review 
characterizes “credit hungry families” as “less affluent families who rely on credit to 
fund lifestyles” and “on the breadline” as including only “singles” and “lone parents.” 
These categories are flawed because they omit an important category of families who 
are “credit hungry” but because they actually need the funds to live a decent life in the 
societies in which they happen to be a member. These persons have no control over the 
fact that home ownership is one of the few means by which their society enables them 
to stay out of poverty, live in safe communities, save for their families, and have good 
schools for their children. Buying a house is not only about consumption of shelter. 
Society cannot both make particular resources essential for people to live a decent life 
and make them available only through private debt markets while depriving people with 
reasonable means by which to acquire these resources in those markets. These 
oversights result from focusing only on a single and incomplete policy aim of financial 
stability, a goal that just might be best achieved by making the unluckiest the worst off 
in the distribution of home mortgage credit.  
Post-crisis, the United Kingdom and the United States have put in place a set of 
hard paternalistic laws governing the conduct of business by mortgage providers. These 
new rules regulate well beyond disclosure requirements (Johnston 2016). Regulation of 
the conduct of business of mortgage providers and actual mortgage terms and 
conditions is designed to deal with the fact that people choose poorly when it comes to 
financial products. These laws deal with problems of poor choice by mortgage 
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borrowers, but they fail to deal with other factors of moral relevance in the design of 
debt regulation.  
 In the United Kingdom, the Turner Review led to a Mortgage Market Review and 
to the Financial Services Act 2012, all of which fed into the Mortgage Conduct of 
Business Regulations now found in the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority Handbook.12 
The Mortgage Conduct of Business (MCOB) chapter in the Handbook deals with the 
“regulated mortgage contract.”13 It requires mortgage providers to assess mortgage 
affordability. It requires stress testing of borrowers by mortgage providers for some 
additional risks such as interest rate risk. It substantially restricts interest-only 
mortgages to borrowers with a repayment strategy independent of selling the property. 
It requires advice only mortgages and offers fewer protections for high net worth 
borrowers (Nield 2015)(Mak 2015)(Nield 2010).14  
In the United States, housing stock is valued at $26 trillion, which makes it the 
largest asset class in the world, worth a modest amount more than capital in the 
American stock exchanges.15 On mortgage affordability, US law is similar to UK law. 
The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2012 Section 
1411 (b) amends the Truth in Lending Act16 by inserting a new section 129C. Title XIV 
of Dodd-Frank is subtitled the Mortgage Reform and Antipredatory Lending Act. 
Section 1411, entitled “Minimum Standards for Residential Mortgage Loans,” 
obligates both mortgage originators and brokers to refrain from making a residential 
mortgage loan unless they make “a reasonable and good faith determination based on 
verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the 
consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all 
applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and 
assessments.”17 Dodd Frank further provides that such a determination “shall include 
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consideration of the consumer's credit history, current income, expected income the 
consumer is reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio 
or the residual income the consumer will have after paying non-mortgage debt and 
mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other financial resources other 
than the consumer's equity in the dwelling.”18 Dodd Frank further requires that a 
mortgage lender “determine the ability of the consumer to repay using a payment 
schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the term of the loan.”19 The US Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau specifies safe harbor or rebuttable presumption 
requirements in its Regulation Z for a “qualified mortgage” meeting these requirements. 
Regulation Z also prohibits interest-only periods in mortgages, negative amortization, 
balloon payments, loans for more than thirty years, and excess points of fees. It specifies 
permissible debt-to-income ratios for borrowing.20 
Financial stability is indisputably an important policy goal for any financial system. 
Mortgage lenders certainly should evaluate the credit risk of borrowers. The UK and 
US mortgage affordability and ability to pay rules go further, however, to impose legal 
responsibility and potential liability on mortgage lenders for the creditworthiness of 
their borrowers. Substantive regulation of mortgages in the form of affordability 
requirements do not only shift costs to the lenders. A rational lender will in turn shift 
them back to borrowers. The borrowers who suffer the most are those least able to bear 
the loss, low net worth homeowners, who have the most to lose. In some cases, 
mortgage debt is a feasible way to distribute resources. It has historically been a 
significant way to distribute wealth to non-saving households in some societies. 
An equality-sensitive set of regulatory institutions would not unduly restrict access 
to credit to those who need it most. The regulatory aim would not be to return to pre-
crisis bad practices of toxic lending based on unverified income, assets, and credit 
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histories but to develop a regulatory toolkit that is sensitive to the fact that restrictions 
alone can inflict serious degradations on people who need credit the most. It is a matter 
of supplementing the financial stability principle with an equality principle. One 
solution might be in soft paternalist approaches to nudge mortgage lenders to offer more 
innovative and less rigid loans. Mian and Sufi advocate a “shared responsibility 
mortgage,” a hybrid concept with features of both debt and what are usually found in 
equity ownership (Mian & Sufi 2014). Equality sensitive regulatory incentives to 
promote product innovation might temper the morally problematic aggregation effects 
of the financial stability principle. Government homebuyer assistance for selected 
categories of low net worth borrowers also may be coupled with innovative mortgage 
products. Governments could tailor homebuyer assistance around concepts of luck. 
Additional solutions would be in policy innovations to mitigate foreclosure or 
repossession externalities.21  
Yet another solution would be to shift the burdens of regulation onto banks that can 
more readily bear the risk, such as in requiring them to hold more equity in their capital 
structure. The current rules on capital adequacy are far from adequate and allow banks 
to maintain dangerous levels of debt on their books (Admati & Hellwig 2014). This 
solution has the advantage of imposing relatively fewer burdens on those less able to 
bear them (low net worth households) and relatively more on those more able to bear 
them (large banks). Still, by itself, capital adequacy rules may result in less lending to 
low net worth borrowers and so should be coupled with policy innovations to 
incentivize lending.   
The basic insights about equality sensitivity in the design of debt regulation and 
contracts apply beyond the example of home mortgages. Sovereign debt is an example 
of an equality-sensitive form of debt. It can be salubrious and effective as a way to 
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support economic and social policy or it could be predatory or odious.22 Sovereign debt 
restructuring is equality sensitive to the extent that the debtor-government would have 
to use resources otherwise used to neutralize inequality or otherwise provide basic 
services to their citizens to service debt to external creditors (Goldmann 2014).  
Some debt is less equality sensitive or not equality sensitive at all. Most forms of 
corporate and commercial debt, for example, are best left to be governed solely or 
primarily by the financial stability principle and principles of economics and finance. 
For example, corporate bonds are probably best understood using standard tools of 
economics and finance because a range of persons in different situations need to be able 
to rely on efficient capital markets to support their pensions, for insurance, for savings, 
and so on. Corporate finance in this sense plays an important social function. In many 
of these contexts, inequality is very purposefully built into the hierarchical structure of 
the finance. Mezzanine finance is an example. Dual class capitalizations offer another 
example. The inequality between debt and equity in corporate finance is 
uncontroversial.   
Finally, another way to develop an equality-sensitive account of access to credit is 
to through a right to access to credit. There indeed may be such a right as Meyer argues 
(Meyer 2017). Meyer argues for two claim rights: one placing a duty on lenders to lend 
to creditworthy applicants and another on the state to provide educational and other 
forms of assistance to prospective borrowers. The focus in this article is on regulatory 
design – on how debt is regulated. The end result just might be, however, that the luck 
egalitarian framework applied here results or settles on rights to access to credit. 





2.3  Relax the Rigidity of Debt in Appropriate Cases  
As we have seen, debt is often referred to with the metaphor of rigidity. Debt is 
rigid because one of its central features is that it is a fixed claim for repayment 
regardless of the value of the underlying asset it might be financing or the debtor’s 
circumstances. Rigidity can be understood using any number of debt instruments. 
Corporations typically have a capital structure comprised of bonds, which are debt, and 
stock, which is equity. Bonds have by their terms a fixed payment structure and pay on 
the basis of their interest rates regardless of the success of failure of the corporation. 
Bond holders are entitled to the same fixed payment until the bond matures, regardless 
of firm performance. Shareholders, however, are known as residual claimants. 
Dividends are generally subject to legal standards prohibiting their payment when the 
corporation is insolvent.23 Shareholder claims are subordinated to those of the 
bondholders both during the life of the corporation and at its death, during liquidation. 
Sovereign debt is also rigid: sovereign bond holders are entitled to payment regardless 
of the state of the finances or the economy of the sovereign debtor. Residential home 
mortgages, a classic form of household debt in many societies, is rigid: if the 
homeowner-borrower loses her job, she cannot go to the bank and ask for forbearance 
while unemployed. If the house is underwater because of massive housing price 
declines and the homeowner-borrower has negative equity in the house, she still must 
pay the mortgage on time and for the fixed and scheduled amount of principal and 
interest. These are but a few examples of debt rigidity. 
Debt’s rigidity makes it entirely insensitive to circumstances and brute luck. This 
circumstance/brute luck-insensitivity makes debt prone to produce social outcomes 
offending egalitarian justice. As explained previously, a positive relationship exists 
between reliance on debt and net worth – the poorer a person is, the more likely she 
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relies on debt to secure resources necessary to live a decent life. Lower net worth 
persons must use costlier means to secure basic resources than higher net worth persons. 
Debt can be an extremely potent driver of inequality.        
Affordability and ability to pay requirements and subsidies for debtors improperly 
focus only on at the point of formation of the debt contract and not on the terms and 
conditions of the contract. Policies focusing only or primarily on affordability or 
subsidy means that policies are focused on the most harmful and restrictive legal means 
to regulate debt from an equality standpoint. If ability to pay or affordability were the 
only policies in play to control debt for financial stability purposes, then governments 
could promulgate regulation that, for example, prohibits home mortgages for all 
households, with annual income, say, below $200,000. Financial stability might result 
from such a draconian policy,  but such a policy would surely offend our notions of 
egalitarian justice. Methods exist to both promote financial stability and that do the least 
amount of harm from an egalitarian point of view.    
Student loans are an example of an area in which debt rigidity has been somewhat 
relaxed through income-based repayments and loan duration limits. There are no 
affordability checks or risk assessments of student loans (Simkovic 2013)(Note 2012). 
In the United States, the financial need of the student determines the amount of the 
government subsidy and in the United Kingdom all student loans are subsidized, though 
the subsidies as between the two countries are different and what is most important is 
the overall cost of the loan to the borrower. While the student loan situation is far from 
ideal, it does show modest movement towards policies to balance subsidies, approval 
requirements, and rigidity relaxation. 
For many years in the United States, student loans did the opposite of neutralizing 
bad brute luck. Rather, they aggravated the effects of bad brute luck because of their 
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extreme rigidity. There was no option for loan forgiveness or income contingent 
repayment for many years and there still is not for loans entered before October 1, 2007. 
Some loans were and continued to be subsidized based on financial need, but these 
subsidies have nothing to do with loan terms on repayment but only with interest rates 
and deferral of interest accumulations until after graduation for subsidized loans. These 
loans were rigid in terms of their repayment obligations and operated like a standard 
debt contract but only with lower costs to the borrower if subsidized. 
For loans issued after October 1, 2007, former President Obama put in place through 
Executive Order a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) or income-contingent system capping 
monthly loan payments at ten percent of a graduate’s monthly income.24 These new 
rules somewhat relax the rigidity of student loans in the United States. Under this 
system, remaining balances are forgiven after twenty years of payment or ten years in 
public service. In the United States, private lenders no longer make government-
guaranteed loans; the government is now lender. The Obama program is similar to the 
program the Browne Report in the United Kingdom recommended, an income 
contingent repayment scheme. The British government has adopted the principal 
aspects of these recommendations (Bolton 2012)(Bolton 2016). Starting in financial 
year 2012/13, UK graduates pay their loans back only when their income reaches or 
exceeds £21,000. An automatic repayment of nine percent above the income threshold 
is netted from the borrower’s pay. A real interest rate will start to be charged when 
income reaches the income threshold, at a maximum of three percent above inflation 
when income reaches a second threshold of £41,000. Both earnings thresholds are 
increased annually. UK student loan debt is forgiven after thirty years.  
Income-based repayment programs implement a limited form of luck neutralization. 
Distributive justice comes in at the back end, not at the front end, as it does with 
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allocations of loans based on financial need. A more progressive form of distribution 
comes in at the contingent repayment level. Payment based on how much a borrower 
earns should result in a more progressive distribution of repayments, in which higher 
earning graduates repay more than lower earning graduates. But they still maintain 
substantial costs for unlucky borrowers because of their limited loan forgiveness 
provisions. Loan rigidity is relaxed but costs over the life of the loan can be high. As 
explained in the context of the UK program: “The impact of these changes on graduates 
is expected to be larger average loans, lower monthly repayments, a large increase in 
the average duration of long, increased average repayments across the lifetime of the 
loan (with the largest increases coming from the highest earners) and an increase in the 
proportion of graduates who have some of their loan written off from around 15% for 
pre-2012 borrowers to around 60%” (Bolton 2016).  
Extreme rigidity remains in the United States for a large inventory of loans issued 
before October 1, 2007. This extreme rigidity also results from the fact that unless a 
debtor in personal bankruptcy proves “undue hardship” in an adversarial proceeding in 
federal bankruptcy court, section 523(a)(8) of the US Bankruptcy Code prohibits the 
debtor from discharging student debt.25 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. states the 
standard test for undue hardship. Debtors must prove that (i) if forced to pay the debt, 
she cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a “minimal” standard of 
living for herself and her dependents; (ii) additional circumstances inform the court that 
this state of affairs will likely persist for a significant portion of the repayment period; 
and (iii) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the student debt.26 This standard 
is very strict and results in relatively few discharges of student loan debt.27 
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British personal bankruptcy law contains a provision like that of Section 523(a)(8), 
making student loans “non-provable” in bankruptcy proceedings generally after 
September 1, 2004, which means they are not discharged in bankruptcy.28 British law 
does not contain any undue hardship relief, but the effects of the provision may be less 
than expected, given that income contingency has been a feature of student loans in the 
United Kingdom since their inception. 
Section 523(a)(8) and provisions like it reflect a contract model of bankruptcy. In 
this contract perspective, the statutory provision effectively mandates a term imposed 
on debtors in favor of creditors, ostensibly designed to prevent opportunism by 
graduates with no assets and supposedly little to lose by declaring bankruptcy soon after 
graduation (Jackson 1986). These rational choice arguments are now suspect for 
reasons having to do with problems of choice and compelling normative arguments also 
exist against the exemption. 
The bankruptcy discharge exemption cannot meet the basic requirements for 
egalitarian justice. It very likely violates the fresh start policy fundamental to personal 
bankruptcy law in the United States (Howard 1987)(Porter & Thorne 2006). The undue 
hardship exemption in Section 523(a)(8) only partly relieves bad brute luck because it 
deals only with a very limited set of circumstances having to do with repayment of the 
particular obligation at hand and not more generally with bad brute luck and how not 
putting graduates in these precarious situations in the first place is the preferable 
position from the standpoint of equality. The provision has substantial and perverse 
redistributive effects on the worse off and those with bad brute luck. Student debt is 
unsecured debt, but the exemption gives it even better protection than secured credit, 
where the issue is whether secured creditors have “adequate protection” under US 
bankruptcy law.29 The private lenders protected by section 523(a)(8) enjoy government 
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guarantees for their loans and so the US federal government has already provided 
insurance against risk of discharge by opportunistic graduates. A mandatory term to 
protect sophisticated institutional creditors from insolvent individual debtors seems 
unwarranted. 
Beyond student lending, there has been little movement towards rigidity relaxation 
but there have been several proposals for innovation on residential home mortgages, 
such as the above-discussed shared responsibility mortgage. Unlike in the United 
States, mortgages in the United Kingdom are overwhelmingly adjustable rate, which 
soften the blow to borrowers in economic declines because interest rates decline as well 
in such periods, but a shared responsibility mortgage goes further. A shared 
responsibility mortgage would be linked to a local house price index. If house prices 
rise or remain the same as when the mortgage was entered, the monthly mortgage 
payment stays the same as does the mortgage amortization schedule. If the house price 
index falls below the level it was when the borrower entered into the mortgage, the 
monthly mortgage payment reduces but the mortgage amortization schedule remains 
the same. This results in an automatic but temporary reduction of the mortgage 
principal. It is temporary because house prices tend to increase the longer the time 
period in which they are considered. So, when the local house price index increases, the 
mortgage payment and principal will revert to its initial state. To eliminate or reduce 
the possibility that the lender will increase mortgage interest rates to compensate for its 
risk in sharing the downside potential of the housing market, the shared responsibility 
mortgage could give the lender, say, a five percent share of the capital gain when the 
home is sold or refinanced. Others have similar advocated alternative mortgage 
products (Campbell 2013)(Cocco 2013). A continuous workout mortgage adjusts 
payments in response to trigger events such as recession or job loss (Shiller, 
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Wojakowski, Ebrahim & Shackleton 2013); Shiller, Wojakowski, Ebrahim & 
Shackleton 2011). Governments also could require or incentivize home owners to buy 
home equity insurance to cover mortgage payments in the event of job loss or other 
developments that hinder ability to pay (Shiller 2012). 
 Sovereign debt is another area in which there have been some proposals for debt 
flexibility but no action by governments, creditors, or international organizations.30 One 
such proposal would be for contingent repayment based on the ability of the sovereign 
debtor to finance basic minimums for their population. Another might be to treat debt 
that is invested for future generations differently than debt intended for short-term 
consumption (Reddy 2007). Other examples are in linking payments or interest rates to 
GDP growth (Shiller 2012). These terms would of course be priced into the debt. 
 Finally, yet another area is in health care finance in states that lack public provision 
of health care. Assume that access to health care in some form constitutes a resource or 
basic social good subject to the demands of equality. This has been the subject of a 
good deal of research (Daniels 1985)(Segall 2009). Health care in countries like the 
United States rely on a mix of private and social insurance and deductibles to pay for 
health care. It has been the case, with some variation, that some less advantaged persons 
cannot afford any health care insurance, and some cannot bear the cost of deductibles 
associated with insurance policies. Some less advantaged persons have no choice but 
to self-insure. The number of personal bankruptcies annually in the United States 
associated with health care expenses is debated but the consensus is that it is significant 
number (Dobkin et al. 2018). Medical debt afflicts a particularly egregious form of 
misery as persons can be critically ill while having to face down medical bill collectors. 
A significant number of these persons afflicted by medical debt are the victims of bad 
brute luck. In situations such as this, some form of equality-sensitive structuring of 
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regulation and policy is required to mitigate the harshness of bad brute luck, which can 
include government engagement in the insurance market, as in the US Affordable Care 
Act. Yet to be innovated would be hybrid debt products linking payment of medical 
expenses to some income-contingency conditions similar to the structure of student 
debt. These are complex products yet to be explored.  
The corollary to the above points on relaxing affordability and rigidity is that any 
debt subsidies would have to be managed so as not to create unsustainable increases in 
asset values, high default rates, and externalities associated with defaults on debt 
obligations. An example of a harmful set of debt subsidies not accompanied by 
relaxation of debt rigidity can be found in the law and financial practices leading up to 
the most recent global economic crisis, with featured easy credit policies and 
government subsidies for mortgage securitization in the United States.31 Governments 
should do both together – subsidize and relax – or neither. 
3. Regulatory Implications 
 Current practices in regulatory agencies have not yet brought the equality 
concerns raised in this article to bear on regulatory design. Most of the advances to date 
have either focused on equality as it relates to protected categories or characteristics 
(race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) or on trying to add distributive weights to some 
form of cost benefit analysis (CBA). Given CBA’s influential role in regulatory design, 
the recommendations here will interact with specific elements of CBA, where 
appropriate. I assume that financial stability can be reliably evaluated using CBA, 
though this finding is contested (Coates 2015). 
The disciplinary approach of this article shares with other philosophical theories 
about equality, at least implicitly, a feature known as a lexical priority: the order in 
which principles of justice, equality, and other normative principles are to be satisfied 
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in any public policy. This article identifies a continuum of forms of debt, some of which 
should be sensitive to concerns of equality and others less so or not at all. We can use 
these features to develop a decision tree to guide regulators, as set forth in figure 1. The 
decision tree is constructed around a threshold decision about whether the form of debt 
to be regulated implicates concerns about equality. If not, then standard CBA 
techniques can be employed in decision making about regulation. If concerns about 
equality are implicated, then the regulator has three choices. First, the regulator can still 
refuse to take equality concerns into account in the very rare case in which concerns 
about financial stability are so serious as to be overriding. This would be the highly 
unusual case in which, first, equality concerns are implicated, and second, to take them 
into account in regulation would likely cause substantial collective harm. Moral theory 
should not be employed to support a rule or action that would be absurd or dangerous. 
Second, the regulator can try to develop distributional weights for CBA in cases in 
which quantification and inclusion of such weights is plausible and reliable. There is 
great interest in this approach (Deighton-Smith, Erbacci & Kauffman 2016). It, 
however, does not comply with the demands of equality developed in this article. It is 
insensitive to the principles elucidated in Part 2. It is included here because there may 
be cases in which it offers a superior alternative from a pragmatic point of view in 
taking some equality concerns into account. There are many problems with this 
approach, not the least of which it can be unreliable and threatens the integrity of CBA, 
and perhaps more importantly for the analysis here, it is not sufficiently sensitive to the 
luck egalitarian considerations elucidated in this article. Lastly, in many cases in which 
the threshold determination is that the equality concerns implicated in this article are in 
issue, the approach to evaluating regulatory options will be in expert judgment as a 
separate and distinct exercise from CBA, the finding of which will trump or override 
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the CBA if CBA outcomes conflict with equality concerns. The use of expert judgment 
to evaluate distributive considerations is in evidence in Canada and to a more limited 
extent in other countries (Deighton-Smith, Erbacci & Kauffman 2016). There is a great 
deal of distance, however, between the findings and recommendations of this article 
and current practice. This article offers a novel set of concrete principles to put this 
expert judgment in new territory grounded in a philosophical theory about equality. To 
date, moral philosophy has had very little if any impact in this area and this article 
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Principles to evaluate equality constraints: 
1.  Avoid financing public goods primarily through private debt 
2. Do not unreasonably restrict equality-sensitive access to credit 
3. Relax the rigidity of debt in appropriate cases 





 This article seeks to promote the development of methodologies to regulate debt 
and access to credit from the standpoint of luck egalitarianism. Normative principles 
currently predominating legal and policy discussions about debt and access to credit 
come primarily from economics and finance. These disciplines offer a substantial set 
of tools to measure and evaluate distribution and inequality. Political philosophy offers 
complementary insights on the situations in which inequality relating to access to credit 
are morally objectionable. Political philosophy is not empirical but can assist 
governments in evaluating legal and policy options. Law, economics, and political 
philosophy can be used in combination to develop debt regulation that aims for fairness, 
efficiency, and justice. This article is an early step in bringing these disciplines together 
to show how governments can undertake this important work.     
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